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Introduction 
The initial objective of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) was to expand the European zone of peace beyond the 
EU’s borders through processes of external governance. It was 
seen as an instrument for promoting security in the region 
through processes of integration and association. Although 
initially developed as a rather coherent policy, it has over the 
years become something very different. In a newly published 
NUPI Working Paper (Batora & Rieker 2015), we examine what 
these changes actually entail. Our main argument is that the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy – the lead 
framework of the EU’s external governance – has been devel-
oping from the original concept of a set of rationally planned 
processes coherent across countries of this Neighbourhood, 
towards a complex and ambiguous set of ‘garbage can’ type of 
processes (Cohen et al 1972) in individual countries. 
Focusing on Ukraine, we find that the original model of a 
rational process, with detailed action plans, monitoring, 
reporting and progress assessment of reforms, has given way 
to a set of loosely coupled processes involving various interests, 
problems, solutions and decision-making situations. EU insti-
tutions and EU member states are involved in various forms 
of engagement with Ukraine, resulting in complex and often 
loosely coupled forms of adaptation. Nevertheless, Ukraine is 
experiencing unprecedented levels of extensive transformation 
processes connecting its various societal segments with the EU. 
Based on this analysis, we offer a novel conceptual understand-
ing of the EU’s neighbourhood policy incorporating the ideas 
of ambiguity and bounded rationality. In this policy brief, we 
will analyse the potential implications of this change for the 
EU’s external governance and thereby also the Union’s security 
community building process as well as Norway’s contribution 
to these processes.
[ 32 / 2015 ]
The idea of ENP as rational external governance
The ENP framework was introduced in 2004 as a by-product 
of the EU’s ‘big-bang’ enlargement. A main motivation for 
introducing the ENP was the desire to prevent major rifts from 
emerging between countries that were invited to join the EU 
and other East European countries. The idea proposed by 
Romano Prodi was to have these neighbouring countries take 
part in European governance, with access to ‘everything but 
institutions’ (Prodi 2002). To this end, countries were asked to 
undertake comprehensive reforms of their economies and gov-
ernance systems in exchange for gradual deepening of their 
ties with the EU and growing attachment to EU policy fields. 
This ENP had two major characteristics. First, it was a process 
aimed at creating a ‘ring of well-governed countries’ around the 
enlarged EU. This entailed putting all countries encompassed 
in the ENP framework under one more-or-less coherent set of 
conditions, processes and procedures of external governance. 
The second characteristic of the original model was its highly 
rationalistic and rationalizing nature. The EU followed the 
same comprehensive pattern institutionally, legally and in 
terms of policy contents in all the countries concerned. 
Then the methodology applied by the EU was built around a 
standardized model consisting of two elements. First, at the 
core of relations with each ENP country is a contractual agree-
ment that is a prerequisite for signing Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreements (PCAs) in Eastern Europe, and Caucasus and 
Association Agreements (AAs) in the South. Second, based on 
these agreements, individual ENP Action Plans were developed 
with each of the ENP countries. These are standardized docu-
ments of about 35 pages that follow the same structure in all 
countries and focus on a relatively uniform set of topics for col-
laboration and governance reform. ENP Progress Reports would 
then provide a regular opportunity for monitoring the develop-
ments and assessing the degree to which the goals and targets 
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in the Action Plans were met. The European Commission and its 
Directorate-General for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy 
has been taking the lead in the management of these processes, 
in cooperation with the External Services of the Commission 
and, following its establishment, the EEAS. In principle, the 
overarching idea when the ENP was launched was to have a 
well-defined and orderly set of transformation processes to lead 
these ‘neighbourhood’ countries towards EU-oriented stand-
ardization of their legislative systems and governance that would 
allow them to share ‘all but institutions’  with the EU.
ENP turning into a flexible process of external gover-
nance
Since 2011, the ENP has been revised and it has gradually 
become a more complex and ambiguous process. We will 
here highlight four factors that clearly illustrate this change. 
First, while the ENP framework uses similar instruments as 
the process of EU enlargement, the central component of the 
latter – the prospect of full EU membership – is missing. That 
makes the ENP profoundly ambiguous in its aims and nature 
of relations with the countries in the neighbourhood. Partly 
as a result of this, countries encompassed in the ENP frame-
work have varied in their preferences concerning attachment 
to the EU. Since 2011, the EU has been applying an increas-
ingly differentiated and bottom–up approach towards the 
partner countries (EU 2015a,b). This shift has to do with the 
fact that ENP countries have been subject to a rather divergent 
set of domestic processes, putting them on diverging paths 
in their relations to the EU over the past decade. While the 
16 ENP countries remain grouped together within the same 
framework, there is a clear difference emerging between the 
nature of relations to countries in the Eastern Neighbour-
hood and the countries in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. 
While the latter do not aspire to EU membership, some of the 
former do, and that also influences the level of ambitions in 
reform processes (Rieker 2016). Moreover, while some ENP 
countries, like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in the east as 
well as Morocco and Tunisia in the south, have been seeking 
closer relations with the EU, consistently implementing vari-
ous kinds of reforms to achieve this, other countries, among 
them Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan, have shown decreas-
ing interest in deepener relations with the EU and have been 
seeking to develop a more detached form of relationship. The 
macro-level dynamic of how neighbouring countries form 
their relationships with the EU is highly diversified. 
Second, the EU and its member states are beginning to 
become more attentive to the geopolitical context (concern-
ing relations with Russia in particular) in developing their 
approach to the neighbourhood (Rieker & Gjerde 2015). The 
interests of the ‘neighbours of the neighbours’ are increas-
ingly recognized as a factor to be reckoned with. Compared 
to its original meaning when introduced by the European 
Commission in 2006,1  the concept today encompasses also 
the interests of Russia and other major geopolitical players 
in the neighbourhood. This shift is supported by a growing 
acknowledgement of the need to shift towards a more geo-
political  approach to the EU neighbourhood  (Fischer 2015). 
Third, the ENP framework was designed in an ambigu-
ous way, leaving room for manoeuvre for member states 
to accommodate their specific interests within the policy 
framework. Among other things, the question of whether the 
possibility of full membership should eventually be granted 
to neighbouring states has been perceived differently by the 
original member states and by those that have joined the EU 
since the 1990s (ibid.). In general, the latter states have been 
most supportive of keeping alive the prospect of further EU 
enlargement to the East. As a result of this ambiguity, EU 
member states continue with varying and parallel strate-
gies in their relations to the countries of the neighbourhood. 
Despite similarities in member-state rhetoric in relation to 
ENP countries, the goals pursued in practice often differ.
Finally, within ENP countries, implementation of the reforms 
identified in the individual ‘ENP Action Plans’ and ‘ENP 
Progress Reports’ has not necessarily been a straightforward 
rational exercise. This means that the EU has been assessing 
various formal indicators in the countries of the Southern 
Neighbourhood to measure their performance in democratic 
reforms, but that these indicators have not really assessed 
actual progress made. Also, reform processes aligning gov-
ernance structures with the EU have progressed well in some 
governance sectors, while there has been less progress in 
others (Bátora and Navrátil 2016). Alternative sources of 
reforms have also played an important role. Non-EU coun-
tries like Canada, Japan, Norway and the USA as well as inter-
national actors such as the World Bank have been involved 
in supporting reform processes in the EU’s neighbourhood, 
often with their own specific agendas and goals. 
The relevant EU institutions and their stakeholders have 
been reflecting upon this. There has emerged a clear realiza-
tion that the ENP as a policy framework needs to be reformed 
to encompass differentiation of relations with partner coun-
tries as a key principle (EU 2015). This builds on the idea 
that the EU will respect partner countries’ strategic choices 
as regards how they wish to constitute their relations with 
the EU. With countries seeking closer association, the EU 
will seek to develop practical steps to deepen relations; with 
countries preferring a more detached form of relations, the 
EU will look for other forms of engagement in line with their 
needs (ibid., p. 3).  In addition, the EU will to a greater extent 
take into consideration the whole region and the geopolitical 
context than the case thus far (ibid., p. 4).
Our argument is that this idea of the EU’s neighbourhood policy 
as a coherent, rationalistic and well-planned strategy is a conven-
ient construct that may not hold up to closer scrutiny. This is also 
particularly evident when studying the policy towards Ukraine.
Ambiguity of reform processes in Ukraine 
As we show in greater detail in the Working Paper (Batora & 
Rieker 2015), the EU, its member states and associated mem-
bers (like Norway), together with their non-governmental or-
ganizations, have been involved in a wide range of reform proc-
esses in Ukraine. As our interviews with senior officials of the 
EEAS as well as member-state delegations to the EU confirm, 
member states have been involved in supporting various kinds 
of reforms – usually in areas where they have the necessary 
expertise and foreign policy priorities. 
Poland, for instance, has been actively involved in Ukraine, sup-
porting anti-corruption measures and processes of decentraliza-
tion. The Polish government’s anti-corruption agency has been 
working with the Ukrainian government in setting up the Ukrain-
1 See On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006)726, 
Brussels: European Commission, p. 11.
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ian anti-corruption bureau. Concerning decentralization, Polish 
experts have assisted the Ukrainian authorities in developing 
legislative proposals for reform of municipalities and municipal 
governance as well as the territorial structure of regions. Similar 
assistance activities have been conducted by experts from Ger-
many, as well as from France and the USA. The Slovak govern-
ment has been involved in two areas in particular: energy sector 
reform and security sector reform. Energy sector reform has also 
been a key priority of work carried out in Ukraine with the as-
sistance of the governments of Denmark, Germany and the Neth-
erlands. France has been involved several reform initiatives; a 
key priority area has been the reform of Ukrainian justice sector. 
Civil society formation and reforms have been the mainstay of 
the work done with assistance from the Czech government. Nor-
way has given priority to reform of the justice sector and energy 
reform, but has also been involved in constitutional reform, nu-
clear safety issues and modernization of the armed forces.2 
In addition to the wide range of reform processes that EU mem-
ber states have been involved in – often in parallel – approaches 
have also varied among member states as regards the nature of 
Ukraine’s future association with the EU. As several interview-
ees pointed out, there has been one group of member states 
who favoured the development of the closest possible ties with 
Ukraine, not excluding the potential of offering full EU mem-
bership. This group has consisted mostly of the Baltic states, 
Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Denmark and the UK. On the other 
hand, there have been several countries – most notably in the 
South of the EU – sceptical to offering Ukraine anything more 
than an Association Agreement within the framework of the 
ENP. That also applies to the latest official standpoints of the 
German government, which has been increasingly cautious 
about going too far in deepening its relations with Ukraine in 
order to avoid damaging relations with ‘the neighbours of the 
neighbours – Russia. Germany is apparently becoming more 
and more aligned with France’s traditional position on ENP/
EaP. While Germany has generally had a fairly open approach, 
the French have insisted on interpreting the ENP as clearly dis-
tinct from the enlargement process – and not even as a poten-
tial preparation phase for future membership.
To address these coordination problems on the strategic level as 
well as on the level of practical conduct of reforms, the EU and 
its member states have been considering various solutions.  One 
of these is an idea voiced in some EU capitals: to appoint a ‘high 
level coordinator’ on the EU side to lead the effort in Ukraine. 
Conceptually and in terms of mandate, such a coordinator would 
correspond more or less to the role of the EU’s High Representa-
tives in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Kosovo. Proponents of this idea 
have envisioned a senior political figure from the EU taking on 
the post (e.g. a former prime minister or foreign minister) so that 
the Ukraine reform agenda could be elevated to a higher level a 
receive proper attention in governmental circles and in EU-level 
institutions. However, as of summer 2015, such a post had not 
been established, and it seemed as though proposals for estab-
lishing such a post were no longer on the agenda. This could 
be explained by lack of member-state consensus as to whether 
establishing such a post would be useful, especially in view of 
existing disagreements concerning the long-term objective of 
the association process. It could also be explained strategically: 
the wish to avoid any further provocation of Russia. In such a 
perspective, a more effective option might be a less visible ‘mud-
dling through’ approach. In our interviews with representatives 
of selected member-state missions to the EU in May 2015, some 
confirmed that debates on this point were ongoing among the 
member states. Other representatives, however, said that such 
debates were no longer on the table, and still others flatly denied 
the very existence of such a debate. 
The reason for such an unstructured approach to Ukraine as 
opposed to, for example, Bosnia-Hercegovina since the late 
1990s has been the fact that the latter did have a clear interna-
tional governance structure in place, with a mandate to oversee 
societal transformation processes and approximation to the EU 
(Bildt 2015). Such a structure is lacking in Ukraine, and so the 
EU, its member states and other actors find themselves involved 
in supporting a multiplicity of transformation initiatives. The 
Support Group for Ukraine as well as the EU Delegation in Kiev 
have been seeking to coordinate efforts on the ground in Kiev 
but such coordination is highly dependent on member-state 
willingness and capacity to coordinate. Moreover, as discussed 
in the previous sections, many member-state development 
projects in Ukraine have been initiated independently of each 
other, and follow time-lines and financing schedules without 
little direct intergovernmental coordination.    
Ambiguity and the EU’s Transformative Power in the 
Neighbourhood
Our analysis show that that the EU’s neighbourhood policy 
as a policy framework has been undergoing a profound trans-
formation and that this has been a process characterized by 
fragmentation of a once-coherent policy framework towards 
an umbrella term for a set of differentiated and fairly specific 
tailor-made policy approaches regulating relations with indi-
vidual countries in the EU Neighbourhood. More profoundly, 
at the level of practice, the case of the Ukraine shows that 
the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, and the reform processes in 
the countries of this neighbourhood conducted as part of this 
policy, are not as rationally calculated as is often believed. 
Rather, much of what the EU and its member states are doing 
in Ukraine seems characterized by multiple and varying defi-
nitions of problems, a multitude of solutions generated and 
provided without clear connections with problems or before 
problems are defined, numerous participants and a plethora 
of reform processes with relatively little effective coordination.
We found, first, that the EU’s reform efforts in Ukraine are char-
acterized by parallelism – problems that need to be addressed are 
defined in multiple ways, with overlapping reform processes in 
initiatives run by the EU, by its member states, by associated non-
member states as well as by other international actors. Second, 
we identified relatively high degrees of path-dependence in the 
reform programmes run by the EU and by Germany, medium-
level path-dependence in Swedish programmes and low levels of 
path-dependence in reform projects run by Norway (See Batora 
& Rieker 2015). This indicates that major reform strategies 
launched in 2014 and 2015 for identifying problems in the post-
Maidan period were constructed in the context of a multitude of 
solutions that were already being implemented on the ground, 
having been defined in the pre-Maidan period. This also makes 
it clear that the ENP is a highly socially embedded strategy, har-
nessing combinations of existing resources while also seeking to 
provide well-defined and rationally calculated reform proposals. 
Third, we have noted multiple and parallel coordination efforts by 
actors from the EU and from the member states, again challeng-
ing the view of the ENP as rationally managed process. Finally, 
2 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/norge-stotter-ukrainas-arbeid-
mot-korrupsjon/id2458843/
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the EU member states, associated non-members and the EU institu-
tions and their various constellations are evidently operating with 
differing visions as regards Ukraine’s future relations with the EU. 
This has made the ENP in Ukraine profoundly ambiguous. 
 
Some of this ambiguity in the EU’s role in the neighbourhood 
has already been discussed and criticized in the academic lit-
erature. Suffice it here to note the ‘capabilities–expectations 
gap’ (Hill 1993) or the above-discussed view of the EU’s reform 
agenda as consisting of symbolic actions and window-dressing. 
However, there has been less focus on the possibility that such 
ambiguity might actually be a source of strength and influence. 
As Olsen (2010) points out, the fact that the EU remains a rather 
ambiguous political entity which various actors associate with 
various meanings may in fact be a condition contributing to the 
EU’s survival. If the EU were clearly identified and following 
steps towards a specific type of political order (e.g. a federa-
tion), it would be easier for internal and external opponents of 
integration to organize resistance and even derail the process. 
Applied to the context of the ENP, the ambiguity of the EU’s engage-
ment with the neighbouring countries, featuring multiple and 
loosely coupled processes involving EU-level institutions as well as 
member-state initiatives, leads to uncertainty in terms of what is 
actually happening to the countries in the neighbourhood. As the 
case of Ukraine shows, there are competing and complementary 
visions as to the problems to be dealt with; it is unclear which solu-
tions are useful and when; many participants are involved, and it 
is often uncertain who is responsible for which parts of the reform 
agenda, and when important decisions can and should be made. 
Implications for EU’s security community building
process and Norway’s contribution
While this may seem as a chaotic situation, it is arguably also 
more difficult for opponents of reforms – whether internal to 
Ukraine or from outside the country (‘neighbours of the neigh-
bours’) – to stage effective opposition to reforms implemented 
according to such a ‘garbage can model’. And for these very rea-
sons, it might be that this model will result in better governance 
structures in Ukraine, a deepening engagement of Ukraine with 
the EU, and thereby a different and more flexible type of secu-
rity community building process – all more sustainable in the 
long run. For Norway, a more flexible process may also be use-
ful. In many ways these changes means that the differences be-
tween the contributions from a member states or a non-members 
become less important.
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